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ABSTRACT
We explore the use of SGX enclaves as a means to improve the
security of handling keys and data in storage systems. We study
two main configurations for SGX computations, as they apply to
performing data-at-rest encryption in a storage system. The first
configuration aims to protect the encryption keys used in the en-
cryption process. The second configuration aims to protect both the
encryption keys and the data, thus providing end-to-end security
of the entire data path.
Our main contribution is an evaluation of the viability of SGX
for data-at-rest encryption from a performance perspective and
an understanding of the details that go into using enclaves in a
performance sensitive environment. Our tests paint a complex pic-
ture: On the one hand SGX can indeed achieve high encryption
and decryption throughput, comparable to running without SGX.
On the other hand, there are many subtleties to achieving such
performance and careful design choices and testing are required.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Intel ® SGX enclaves[5] provide hardware enforced confidentially
and integrity guarantees for running computations. This is mainly
achieved by encrypting all information as it leaves the CPU, ef-
fectively shielding data in the memory from external observers.
There are numerous use cases for SGX that range from running
analytics over encrypted data (e.g. [15, 20, 22, 26]) to improving
confidentiality in distributed infrastructures (e.g. Tor, Blockchain,
Zookeeper) to running entire applications and ecosystems inside
enclaves ([11, 13, 14]). While some of these applications include
large amounts of code and functionality inside enclaves, the original
concept of SGX was created with less ambitious use cases in mind,
in which minimal parts of the computation (and the code associated
with it) are placed into enclaves. For example, Intel’s initial papers
[18] describe password protection and DRM use cases. In this work
we study the performance aspects of using SGX for security hard-
ening in a use case in which only a small part of the application
needs to reside in an enclave. There are numerous applications and
uses-cases where only a limited part of the application needs to
read and update the data, and the majority of the application deals
with aspects such as storing the data, routing it, or making sure it
is highly available or durable. In such use cases we can identify a
small part of the application that implements the functionality that
works on the data, and use enclaves as secure and tamper-proof
silos for performing these operations. Examples of operations could
be data transformations, local tests on data, and cryptographic func-
tions on data blocks. Specifically, the main use case that we study
in this paper is that of securing the data path and hardening the
security of data-at-rest encryption in storage systems such as block
storage systems, file systems or object storage. In these systems
the data is mostly considered “payload” and the operations on the
actual data are very limited, as the goal of the storage system is
to make the data accessible, highly available, durable and resilient,
requirements which have very little to do with the actual content
of the data. Therefore implementing encryption in SGX enclaves is
a good match for the use-case we choose. In addition, we especially
focus on performance oriented systems in which the throughput of
enclave operations is expected to be high, therefore it is important
to understand the overhead of running functions in SGX enclaves.
One would expect some overhead due to the added encryption
and decryption complexity. In addition, extra security measures
such as integrity tests and memory usage limitations can also af-
fect performance. We present a set of micro-benchmarks that shed
some light on the viability of using enclaves vs. running outside
enclaves. Our use case avoids workloads that are documented to
be bad for SGX performance (see [10, 11]. These include workloads
that require frequent small random access operations or workloads
that require a very large amount of data to be in encrypted memory
simultaneously.
The main questions that we ask are:
• Can SGX enclaves achieve high throughput, comparable to
running the same operation without enclaves?
• What subtleties arise from using SGX for this use-case and
how much development work is required in order to get
acceptable performance?
Our results paint a rather complex picture. On the one hand,
we see cases in which the answer to the first question is positive –
running in an SGX enclave can indeed achieve very high throughput
(as much as 90 − 99% of running without an enclave). On the other
hand, such performance does not come easily.We observe that there
are many subtleties that affect enclave execution, and note that
simply running what seems to be a perfectly good implementation
can at times result in very low performance. Key factors such as
block size, multi-threading and the exact library involved are key
to achieving acceptable performance.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
There are several main components to SGX that allow it to provide
a higher level of security than running on “untrusted" CPU. A
central mechanism is the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) which
performs real time encryption of all communication between the
CPU and the memory. SGX enclaves have the capability to access
the entire main memory of the machine. However, the MEE is only
invoked on a special designated area of the memory called the
Enclave Page Cache (EPC). This memory area is a very small space
out of the entire memory, and in most existing systems is limited
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to 128MB (or even 96MB after reducing space used for managing
the enclaves).
SGX performance overheads can result from a number of reasons
[10]: first is the actual overhead of accessing the encrypted memory
via the MEE. A second reason is the overhead associated with
entering and exiting an enclave. In order to ensure the isolation of
these processes, enclaves are only invoked via a special interface
called ECALLs (defined in an "edl" file). The ECALLs are known
to have a performance impact due to the CPU’s context switches.
Several works including [21, 24] work to minimize this overhead by
avoiding ECALLs as much as possible. There is also the limitation
of the EPC size, and when operating with memory that exceeds the
EPC size there is a need for paging of EPC pages to regular memory,
introducing significant additional latency. This operation requires
both data migration as well as encryption of data before it lands in
regular memory (and decryption when pulled back in). Some works
manage to improve the efficiency of this process [11, 21] but cannot
remove the overhead altogether. Another source of overhead is
in the handling of cache misses and specifically the mechanisms
that prevent replay attacks on enclaves [17]. As a result, “cache
non-friendly" workloads are expected to suffer more inside enclaves
than in regular operation. In our work we manage to observe all of
these phenomena, and attempt to actually quantify their effects for
our use-case.
Additional related works include various implementations of
systems that run overall performance tests of their implementations.
Examples of such works include [16, 23, 26]. Our work attempts to
quantify the performance effect of the storage encryption use-case,
and understand the subtleties involved that may affect a wide array
of other use cases.
3 STORAGE SYSTEMS ENCRYPTION
Our study is motivated by the world of storage systems in which
data-at-rest encryption is now a prevalent practice. This practice
involves data arriving at the storage system, either in clear text or
encrypted in transit (e.g., IPSEC or HTTPS), and then encrypted
before being persisted to disk. Its purpose is to ensure that all
persistent data is always encrypted, so that loss of hardware, either
due to hardware failure or due to malicious behavior, does not
compromise the data.
One common approach to handling the encryption/decryption
is the use of Self Encrypting Drives (SEDs). In such drives, a special
cryptographic processor is built into the hard drive’s circuit and
performs all encryption and decryption operations (typically an
AES encryptor). The encryption keys are communicated over a
secure channel into the drives rendering them unreachable without
tampering with the SED hardware protection. However, in the
absence of SEDs, many systems rely on software based encryption
and decryption (e.g. [1–3]). In order to perform software encryption
and decryption using the CPU, the encryption keys must reside in
clear text inmemory, presenting a significant security risk. Sensitive
data keys are vulnerable to either privileged users or to memory
sniffing techniques.
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Figure 1: When only keys are secured by the enclave, both
encrypted and decrypted buffers are in the general memory.
3.1 Protecting the Keys Using SGX
By placing the software encryption process and key handling inside
enclaves, one achieves a much stronger protection: keys are never
in the clear – they are communicated over a secure channel into the
enclave, and placed in encrypted memory in which all encryption
and decryption is performed. Note that in this solution, the pro-
tection is of the data encryption keys rather than of the data itself.
For systems in which data arrives in the clear (rather than over a
secure channel) this makes perfect sense. Data is only protected
at rest, but the data keys (which are inherently more sensitive)
are encrypted at all times. This is mostly the case today due to
performance limitations of the storage clients.
When working in this setting, it should be noted that data does
not need to reside in the enclave’s encrypted memory. Enclaves are
allowed to access the general memory, and so the data buffers (both
encrypted and cleartext) can reside outside of the enclaves memory.
An encryption request to the enclave is performed via an ECALL
that gets pointers to two buffers in the general (non-encrypted)
memory. This is an important subtlety which has a performance
impact which will be discussed and demonstrated in Section 5. This
solution is depicted in Figures 1 and provides equivalent security
guarantees as SEDs provides for the data keys.
3.2 End-to-End Data protection
Data-at-rest security as a sole encryption protection is quite a com-
mon configuration in many enterprise settings. However, this is
changing with the growing awareness to threats, the movement to
the cloud and the improvement of encryption capabilities. Data-in-
transit encryption is now required in many scenarios, typically via
one of the prevalent standards such as HTTPS, SSL, TLS, FTPS, etc.
In this mode of operation, a secure channel is negotiated between
a client and a server through which data is encrypted for the dura-
tion of the transfer, but decrypted upon arrival. While the data is
now protected traveling through the network until arriving to the
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Figure 2: In the end-to-end variant, the clear text data must
reside inside the enclave memory. In reality, there may be
another temporary encrypted buffer to hold the TLS en-
crypted data. This buffer is encrypted and hence can reside
in the general memory.
storage system and when residing on disk, this does leave the data
in the clear while in memory until it is re-encrypted for data-at-rest
protection. This is where SGX enclaves can close the gap and create
a full end-to-end security of data — data is received and decrypted
only inside the SGX enclave and encrypted for at-rest using keys
stored in the enclave. Therefore, from the time data leaves the client
to the storage until it is read again, it is kept encrypted in all stages.
Together with the advantages of key protection described in the
previous section, using enclaves for end-to-end security is a very
appealing notion.1
We note that such a strong notion of security cannot be achieved
using SEDs, since the termination of the secure channel cannot be
done at the disk level and therefore data is decrypted in memory
before being persisted. In order for enclaves to close the gap, it is
required that both the establishment of the secure (e.g. the TLS
handshake) and the termination of the protocol must happen inside
an enclave. We note that several works and open source projects
deal with how to do this inside an enclave (e.g. [4, 9, 12, 19, 25]).
Figure 2 describes the flow of this solution.
4 EVALUATION
Our benchmarks were tested in the following setup: We used two
testing setups, a Lenovo server with 4-core Intel ® Xeon ® Pro-
cessor E3-1270 v5 CPU with 3.60GHz, 16GBRAM, and a Lenovo
laptop with a 4-core Intel Core ® i7-6820HQ CPU with 2.70GHz,
using 32GB RAM. The software ran on an Ubuntu 16.04 OS and the
1It should be noted that an alternative to achieving end-to-end security is to simply
encrypt data at the client side (outside the storage), and never decrypt it in the storage.
However, in the case of multiple clients (i.e., machines) accessing the same data, this
moves key management complexity to the client side (since all clients are required to
encrypt and decrypt using the same keys) making this alternative unpopular.
libraries that we used were the Intel SGX Linux 2.0 [6] and SGXSSL
[7] (taken from the intel-sgx-ssl git repository on Nov 29th 2017).
Our goal was to evaluate SGX with respect to AES encryption,
which is required for our Section 3 use case. However, AES encryp-
tion is a complex function that requires specialized CPU commands
and its performance can vary significantly with different imple-
mentations (as will be seen in Section 5). In particular, common
AES implementations do not seamlessly compile on SGX and their
libraries need to be slightly modified in order to run inside SGX
enclaves. Instead of jumping directly to AES, we start by evaluating
a toy example first – we take a very simple function with the only
requirement that it touches the entire input buffer. Specifically, we
tested the overhead of finding the maximum 4-byte integer of a
given byte array (i.e., we treat an array of N bytes as an array of
N/4 integers). Our objective is to identify and evaluate the main
performance obstacles of running inside an SGX enclave.
4.1 Testing a Toy Example
We implemented four variations of the function find_max:
(1) A regular function running in the untrusted area as one
would run it without enclaves.
(2) Copy and compute version - the array is copied into the
enclave’s encrypted memory and then iterated over. This is
implemented using an ECALL, in which the input array is
declared with the "in" option in the edl file.
(3) Compute on encrypted memory - in this option we find
the maximum on an array that resides in the enclave’s en-
crypted memory. The array is prepared before the ECALL
(by a previous ECALL). This is similar to option 2, but does
not include the initial buffer copying operation in the mea-
surements. This usages matches the end-to-end encryption
setting described in Section 3.2.
(4) Compute on cleartextmemory - in this option the ECALL
finds the maximum of a given external input array without
copying it into the enclave’s memory (namely, accessing only
clear-text memory). This is achieved by declaring the array
with the ”user_check" option in the edl file. This usage
corresponds to the protecting of keys only mode described
in Section 3.1.
Of the 3 enclave variants (variants 2, 3, and 4), option 4 should
be the fastest, as it does not require the array to be decrypted by
the SGX’s Memory Encryption Engine (MEE). Options 2 and 3 do
require the MEE decryption in order to perform the computations
(while option 2 also involves MEE encryption as well as decryption).
By evaluating the performance of these three options we gain
a pretty good understanding of the expected overhead of ECALL
context-switches, the overhead of the MEE operations, and what is
the overhead of copying data using the "in" (or "out") declarations
in the edl. These observations should hold for other computations
other than just the "find_max" function. For evaluating the per-
formance of each option, we compared the throughput of the calls
using various array sizes. The results in Figure 3 show the through-
put (MBs processed per second) as a function of the array size. These
numbers are a single thread test (multiple threads will be discussed
in Section 5.1). The first observation is that for small arrays, there
is a huge overhead in running a function in an enclave; this is likely
3
caused by the context switches overhead of entering and exiting the
enclave. This overhead becomes negligible for larger buffers and
the gap between the untrusted and the two faster trusted versions
(versions 3 and 4) is mostly closed with arrays of size larger than
256KB.
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Figure 3: The processing throughput of the toy example
function “find max".
There are three other interesting phenomena: First, for arrays
of size larger than 8MB, we see a throughput degradation in the
ECALL that runs on enclave encrypted memory. This is related to
additional L3 cache misses when reading an enclave’s local array (in
our setup, L3 cache is of size 8MB). Second, for large array sizes that
are greater than the size of the enclave page cache (EPC) (96MB),
there is a dramatic drop off. This is the expected drop caused since
the EPC can no longer hold the entire buffer in encrypted memory
and a paging mechanism is invoked to page this data in and out of
regular memory (encrypting and decrypting on the way). Finally,
the ECALL that uses the "in" option has a significant slowdown for
arrays of size larger than 64KB. Our limited investigation indicates
that this may be caused by a slowdown when calling the function
memcpy() inside an enclave with buffers of size larger than 64KB.
5 TESTING AES-GCM ENCRYPTION
We turn to test the overhead of encrypting and decrypting mes-
sages. In particular, we focused on testing AES128-GCM encryption.
The basic methodology that we used was to create a buffer in mem-
ory and encrypt it a large number of times using either a regular
function or an ECALL. Hence the buffer is “hot" in memory, i.e.,
cached in the CPU, which should be the case in a storage use-case
in which a buffer is encrypted upon its arrival and creation. 2 Each
test is run 30 times and the results presented here are averages. In
this section we present the finding for a single threaded execution
(multiple thread results are presented in Section 5.1). Note that the
results for decryption (rather than encryption) were very similar
so we only present the encryption numbers here.
For the “trusted" variants (inside an enclave), we evaluated two
libraries: sgxsdk [6] and sgxssl [7]. In the untrusted area we tested
openssl [8].
2We note that we also ran some tests with “cold" buffers and these revealed that
performance inside enclaves suffers a bigger slowdown than running in regular mode.
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general memory.
We first focus on the key protection variant of encryption in
which the encryption and decryption buffers are in regular memory.
This uses an ECALL implementation in which both the input buffer
and the output buffer are declared with the "user_check" option.
The results, shown in Figure 4 showed the following behavior:
• The sgxsdk version achieves a maximal throughput of about
43% of the untrusted throughput. This is due to the fact that
by default it runs a non-optimized version of Intel’s IPP
Crypto library which does not use Intel’s AES-NI hardware
optimizations. We were told that by manually compiling and
linking the SDK with an optimized binary of the IPP Crypto
for SGX, one might achieve the desired acceleration.
• The sgxssl test showed an expected behavior: on short mes-
sages, we have a significant gap between the trusted and un-
trusted throughput, which is caused by the context switches
overhead. However, for large messages, the trusted version
essentially closes the gap with the untrusted library, achiev-
ing around 96% of the throughput of untrusted version (at a
rate of about 5GB/sec).3
• It should be noted that the initial performance that we saw
for the sgxssl implementationwas extremely slow and achieved
only a 110MB/sec throughput (about 2% of the untrusted
throughput). After sharing this information with Intel the
problem was identified and there exists a patch to fix it (see
documentation in [7]).
We then tested the encryption in the end-to-end use-case, in
which the input messages reside in the enclave’s encrypted memory
rather than clear-text input buffers from the untrusted memory.
Note that in this test we did not simulate the arrival of the buffer into
enclave memory (which should involve a decryption process), but
rather generate this buffer in advance and test the encryption time.
The results, in Figure 5, are very close to those of the key-protection
variant, except for a significant difference for the large buffers. The
sgxssl code suffers from a throughput degradation on messages
of size larger than 8MB, which is attributed to cache misses on
the L3 cache (a similar degradation to the degradation observed in
3The extremely high AES encryption that we see can be attributed to optimizations of
the Skylake processor, the use of the AES-NI hardware acceleration instruction set,
and the fact that our tests encrypt data that probably reside in the cache.
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Figure 5: Encryption throughput of three code variants for
the end-to-end scenario in which the data buffer is in the
EPC.
the find_max test). This reduces the maximal throughput of the
enclave variant on large buffers to about 70% of the throughput of
untrusted version. Growing the buffer further (above the EPC size
threshold of 92GB) results in a massive degradation in trusted code
throughput (this is not shown in the figure).
An interesting note is that the degradation due to the L3 cache
miss only affects very high performance code and is not seen in
“slower" code running inside enclaves. For example, the sgxsdk ver-
sion which achieves approximately 40% of the maximal throughput
does not show degradation (this was also the case for SHA256 tests
that we ran and achieve a lower throughput altogether).
5.1 The Effect of Multiple Threads
The evaluation of a single thread offers only part of the picture
and we move to explore the impact of running multiple concurrent
threads. Our tests from here on focus just on the fastest library ver-
sions, the “trusted" (inside an enclave) and “untrusted".4 We tried
running several configurations: (1) multiple processes; (2) multiple
threads with a single enclave; and (3) multiple threads with sepa-
rate enclaves. We did not see any significant difference between
the results of these configurations and we present results for the
second configuration of threads using a single enclave instance.
The methodology that we used for testing is to create a number of
threads and run repeating encryption tests for all of them on their
respective buffers. We run included a warm-up and cool down to
ensure that all thread measurements are done with all threads exe-
cuting simultaneously. This test is aimed at measuring the maximal
throughput of a fully utilized system.
Results for the key protection use case (regular memory) are
in Figure 6 and for the end-to-end use case are in Figure 7. The
first thing that pops out when looking at the results is the strong
effect that the buffer size has on the multi-threading performance
regardless of enclaves and SGX. Namely, we see a bit dropoff when
running multiple threads once the buffers cross the 1MB threshold.
This becomes even more noticeable as the number of threads grows
(e.g. for 8 threads the drop off happens once the buffer size exceeds
4In particular we used the encryption library from the open source project Opaque [26]
which achieves similar performance to sgxssl. This was instead of using the sgxssl
version, which was not fixed yet at the time we ran our tests.
512KB). The good news is that this effect is similar both inside and
outside enclaves. For the regular memory test (Figure 6), the trusted
execution in enclaves reaches very similar results to that outside
enclaves. This happens once the buffer is large enough to overcome
the costs of the ECALL context switches. In the encrypted memory
case (Figure 7), the situation changes and running inside enclaves
does take a toll. In particular, the trusted execution at the best
buffer size loses approximately 10% of the potential throughput
when running with 4 threads.
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Figure 6: Encryption throughput for 1, 2 and 4 threads for
the regular memory setting. Cache issues cause the multi-
threaded operation to drop for large buffers for trusted and
untrusted alike.
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Figure 7: Encryption throughput for 1, 2 and 4 threads for
the encrypted memory setting. Notice that with 4 threads
the trusted version does not reach the untrusted numbers.
Figure 8 shows the effect of growing the number of threads be-
yond 4 on a few select buffer sizes. The machines on which we
tested had 4-cores and 8 thread hardware support. So we expected
the tests to achieve up to a factor of 4 on the single thread per-
formance, and were unclear what additional threads would gain.
This was very close to what we saw in practice and indeed the
performance is near linear for the first 4 threads and then plateaus
and even declines. Here too we can see that running on encrypted
memory takes a toll and the trusted execution does not catch up to
the untrusted run.
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Figure 8: The throughput for various buffer sizes as a function of the number of threads. The top row relates to the key
protection model and the bottom row to the end-to-end encryption.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
On the positive side, we see that by choosing correct buffer sizes
and correct library configurations, SGX enclaves can achieve very
high throughput, on par with code running outside enclaves.
On the other hand, we see that nothing is simple with SGX en-
claves. First, using the default crypto libraries provided by Intel ®,
or any library ported for SGX, does not guarantee optimal perfor-
mance. Second, even when we have a code that achieves an optimal
throughput when it accesses a clear-text data, it might not achieve
that when it accesses an enclave’s local memory. In fact, when
running on an enclave’s memory, there seems to be a limited sweet
spot, where the input should not be too small nor too large. There
are many subtleties here and depending on the number of threads
and other work being run in the background, finding the correct
configuration can be tricky. In particular, large buffers suffer from
the strong effect of cache misses on enclaves, while small buffers
suffer from ECALLs. Using mechanisms for avoiding ECALLs (e.g.
[21, 24]) may have a positive effect improve the ability to achieve
high throughput also when many threads or other work in the
system are challenging the L3 cache. Our strongest impression was
that without actual performance testing, it is difficult to predict the
performance of computations running inside an SGX enclave.
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